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DEFINING "FAMILY" - A COMMENT
ON THE FAMILY REUNIFICATION
PROVISIONS IN THE IMMIGRATION ACT
Deborah McIntosh*
INTRODUCTION
Working as an immigration lawyer in the 1980s requires the application
of restrictive and conceptually limited legislation to problems deserving
of legislative creativity and open mindedness. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the area of Family Reunification and the sections of the
Immigration Regulations' allowing Permanent Residents in Canada to
"sponsor" applications for landing made by their close relatives.
The Immigration Act, 19762 states in its opening policy paragraphs (s. 3
(c)) that a foremost goal of the Act is to "facilitate the reunion in
Canada of Canadian citizens and permanent residents with their close
relatives from abroad". In a year where refugee policy in Canada will
regress to pre-World War II restrictiveness3, and applications for land-
ing by "independent" applicants who are non-sponsorable by close family
members are almost universally refused, the principle of family reunifi-
cation is echoed at every opportunity by government spokespersons seek-
ing to reassure the public that Canada's economic and humanitarian
commitment to immigration is not dead. Typical is the following state-
ment from the Standing Committee Report on Family Reunification:
"Family reunification has been, and will continue to be, the
cornerstone of Canada's immigration policy. The Committee
believes that family reunification is the most important and
sensitive aspect of our policy and should continue to be so. In
recent years, the family class has become the largest single
* Copyright © 1987 Deborah McIntosh. Deborah McIntosh is a student at
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Downsview, Ontario. This paper was
selected for publication through the special arrangement of the Intensive
Poverty Law Program at Osgoode Hall Law School with the Journal of Law and
Social Policy (see Editor's Note).
1 Regulations pursuant to the Immigration Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52.
2 Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52
3 See Bill C-55, An Act to amend the Immigration Act, 1976 and to amend other
Acts in consequence thereof, 2d Sess., 33d Parl., 1986-87.
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component of Canada's immigration intake. Every second per-
son who obtains landed immigrant status has qualified
because of his or her relationship to a close family member in
Canada."4
Given that family reunification constitutes the "cornerstone of Canada's
immigration policy"', and that the government has acknowledged the
need for Canada to continue admitting a certain number of immigrants
each year, what exactly is Canada's legislative commitment to the reun-
ification of immigrant families? What kind of family does the
Immigration Act and Regulations seek to reunite? Is the legislative defi-
nition of family a reasonable one given the reality of family structure in
other countries of the world? The answer is a resounding "no", and the
problem has not escaped the attention of public, legal and immigrant
minds alike.
PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT DEFINITION
The restrictive definition of family in the Regulations has been the focus
of many community groups concerned with immigration policy, including
the newly formed Coalition for a Just Refugee and Immigration Policy.
The Coalition stated in a document prepared for its inaugural press
conference:
"...Immigrants and Canadian citizens must be allowed to bring
their families (for example siblings) to Canada promptly...
[the Coalition suggests reform of the definition of "family" for
sponsorship purposes to include siblings and children regard-
less of age].
"...[yet] instead of implementing these essential reforms, the
government has not expanded the definition of family to
facilitate family reunification".'
A Toronto committee, the Non-Status Residents Support Committee
(NSRSC) points out in a brief prepared for Gerry Weiner, Minister of
State for Immigration, that
"...the definition of "family" contained in the Immigration
Regulations is out of step with the multicultural character of
Canada - it fails to recognize many different and equally
valid ideas of "family" held by Canadians.
4 Ninth Report of the Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and
Immigration - Family Reunification (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 17 June 1986) at 2.
s Ibid.
6 Statement prepared in advance of a press conference, Coalition for a Just
Refugee and Immigration Policy (March 1987) at 1.
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The definition is contrary to the spirit and intent of the
Immigration Act, 1976. ,7
The Immigration Regulations do allow for sponsorship of applications
for landing of legally married spouses, unmarried children less than
twenty-one years of age, orphaned siblings under eighteen years of age,
"fianc~s", and children under thirteen years of age whom the Canadian
citizen or permanent resident intends to adopt (see Appendix I, s. 4(1) of
the Immigration Regulations). The Regulations as they presently exist
do not allow for sponsorship of children over twenty-one, siblings, com-
mon-law spouses or "equivalents", or de facto family members, i.e. mem-
bers of an extended family who are financially or psychologically
dependent. These restrictions create problems which do not present
themselves to the legal practitioner with a theoretical face. Rather, it
is an almost daily occurrence that the immigration practitioner must
inform a would-be "sponsor" that the family member she or he wishes to
sponsor does not "fit" the relevant legislation. Inevitably the client is
appalled to discover that someone she or he considers to be close family
is not "family" at all for the purposes of Canadian immigration law.
Participation in immigrant discussion groups and protest demonstrations,
as well as personal experience with immigrant clients, has brought to
the author's attention the following examples of the inadequacy of the
existing regulations governing family reunification:
A Salvadoran couple wish to sponsor their widowed mother,
aged sixty four, widowed sister, aged thirty seven, and the
sister's two children. Under the Regulations they can apply
to sponsor their mother, but their widowed sister is not spon-
sorable. The mother and sister, and the two children raised
by them collectively are, they explain, an inseparable family
unit.
In many countries of the world, divorce is not a legal possibil-
ity. Argentina, for example, only recently enacted a legal pro-
vision for divorce. At present, an estimated two million
Argentinians live with someone other than his or her spouse!
A person immigrating to Canada and subsequently wishing to
sponsor his or her common-law spouse may do so only as a
"fiancee" pursuant to s. 4(1) of the Regulations, and only
where there is no legal impediment to a marriage within
ninety days of the sponsored applicant's arrival in Canada.
7 Sojourners With Us - Non Status Residents in Canada, A Brief of Concerns
and Recommendations submitted to the Honourable Gerry Weiner, Minister of
State for Immigration, by the Non-status Residents Support Committee,
Toronto, Ontario (24 March 1987) at 6.
8 "Divorce Legalized in Argentina", The Toronto Star (23 June 1987) at A4.
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Since a prior existing marriage clearly constitutes a "legal
impediment", the common-law spouse, regardless of the dura-
tion of the relationship or the number of children born of it, is
not sponsorable.
Legal convention in many countries, for example Trinidad,
does not necessitate the formal adoption of children raised by
persons other than their biological parents. These children
may grow to an age older than thirteen wthout the issue of
their legal adoption becoming relevant. Unfortunately, under
Canadian immigration law the issue is crucially relevant, and
a child in this position over the age of thirteen is not sponsor-
able, regardless of the number of years he or she has lived
with the non-biological parents.
Gay and Lesbian couples are as invisible in Canadian immi-
gration law as they are in our provincial family legislation. A
homosexual "spousal equivalent" is not sponsorable, as the
Regulations define "spouse" as a "party of the opposite
sex...
9
These examples are illustrations of only a few of the many problems
created by the narrow definition of "close relative" contained in s. 4(1) of
the Immigration Regulations. They are, however, representative of the
types of problems that have led groups as diverse as the Coalition for a
Just Refugee and Immigration Policy (CJRIP), the Non-Status Residents
Support Committee (NSRSC) and the Standing Committee on Labour,
Employment and Immigration (hereinafter referred to as the "Standing
Committee") to make certain recommendations to the government regard-
ing the efficacy of current family reunification provisions. These recom-
mendations focus almost universally on the need for immigration
legislation to recognize and implement a more expansive definition of
"family" which would be in keeping with both the "evolving concept of
the family in Canadian domestic law",1 and the concept of "extended
family" long recognized in other cultures and increasingly a part of
Canadian life. A brief survey of these recommendations, the reasoning
behind them and the means by which they might be recognized in the
form of legislative amendments follows.
9 Regulations pursuant to the Immigration Act S.C. 1976-77, c. 52.
10 See supra, note 7 at 6.
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PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
1. ALL UNMARRIED CHILDREN, NOT JUST THOSE UNDER THE
AGE OF TWENTY-ONE, SHOULD BE SPONSORABLE
This recommendation is raised both by the Standing Committee, and by
the NSRSC. Both committees express concern regarding the arbitrary
nature of a "cut-off" age of twenty-one. The NSRSC states simply that
"[The rule excluding children over twenty-one] runs counter to
Canada's commitment...to reunite Canadian citizens and per-
manent residents with close relatives from abroad. Although
the Immigration Policy Manual allows some children over
twenty-one to be admitted, this discretion is strictly defined
and interpreted and therefore fails to deal with the vast
majority of people in this situation."'1
The Standing Committee suggests as a solution to the problem of the age
"cut-off" for dependent children that a concept of "actual" dependency be
introduced. The Committee's concern lies in its acknowledgement that a
legislated age of dependency ought to be re-examined in light of the
equality provisions in s.15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,'2
which prohibit discrimination on the basis of age. An "actual depen-
dency" test, the Standing Committee feels, would more reasonably cover
the situation of a son or daughter financially dependent on parents past
the age of twenty-one, as well as allowing for unusual cases of mental or
physical dependency. "While the age of presumed dependency might
have to be changed," the Standing Committee has stated "the concept of
actual dependency should apply, regardless of age".13
Section 3 of the Immigration Act, 1976 states that
"...Canadian immigration policy and the rules and regulations
made under this Act shall be...administered in such a manner
as to...recognize the need...
(f) to ensure that any person who seeks admission to Canada
on either a permanent or temporary basis is subject to stan-
dards of admission that do not discriminate on grounds of race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion or sex."'4
t See supra, note 7 at 6.
12 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 1982, c.11.
13 See supra, note 4 at 10.
14 Supra, note 2.
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Section 15 of the Charter introduces additional grounds of discrimina-
tion, both explicit and implicit, as limitations on governmental action.
The Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights affirms a position
that these newly recognized limitations should be reflected in the stated
objectives of Canadian immigration poicy, and recommends that section
3(f) of the Immigration Act be amended to state that the Act and
Regulations ought not to discriminate in a manner prohibited by the
Charter.""
While the age provision existing in s.4(1)(b)(i) of the Regulations may
be challenged under s.15 of the Charter, such a challenge will not neces-
ssarily be sufficient to eliminate any reference to "dependency" at all.
Groups like the NSRSC and the CJRIP, which requested in its statement
that the "government expand the definition of family to include all
children"' (emphasis added), may find "dependency" will ultimately
replace age as a means of preventing older children from reuniting with
their parents in Canada.
2. THE DEFINITION OF SPOUSE SHOULD INCLUDE ALL COMMON-
LAW SPOUSES AND SPOUSAL "EQUIVALENTS"
Section 4(1)(a) of the Immigration Regulations states that Canadian cit-
izens and permanent residents may sponsor an application for landing
made by his or her spouse. This provision becomes problematic for many
individuals only in light of the Act definitions of "spouse" and
"marriage", which act to exclude from the provision common-law spouses
and spousal "equivalents" such as partners in a homosexual relationship.
The Act defines "spouse" "with respect to any person, [as] the party of
the opposite sex to whom that person is joined in marriage". "Marriage",
the Act elaborates, is "...a marriage by the laws of the country in which
it took place, but does not include any matrimony whereby one party to
that matrimony became at any given time the spouse of more than one
living person".17 Moreover, a Canadian citizen or permanent resident
may, pursuant to s. 4(1)(f) of the Regulations sponsor an application for
landing made by his or her "fiance". A "fianc" may not be sponsored
under s. 6(1)(d) of the Regulations where there is a "legal impediment"
to the proposed marriage. 8 The Sponsorship may only take place under
an agreement to marry within ninety days of the applicant's admission
to Canada.
1s Equality for All: Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights,
Issue 29 (October 1985) at 60.
16 Supra, note 6.
17 Supra, note 2.
'a8Supra, note 9.
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The NSRSC states the problem inherent in this provision most succinctly
in its brief:
"Immigration regulations should recognize that many family
units are established and endure without any formal sanction.
At present, a common-law spouse cannot sponsor his or her
partner, but can sponsor their child. Partial recognition of
non-marital family units is unrealistic and unfair. This
impediment to family reunification cannot always be over-
come by the partners simply marrying."19
Families and relationships exist, both in Canada and elsewhere in the
world, which are not legally recognized. Barred from reunification by
restrictive legislation, an applicant's only legal alternative may lie in
what are known as "humanitarian and compassionate" considerations.
Both at the administrative level and at the statutory level this is a
highly discretionary and uncertain area of immigration policy. The fact
that a "humanitarian and compassionate" immigration official may
well be neither of those, or overly ethnocentric, means that there is
little chance of success, particularly for homosexuals, an absolute ban on
whom was only removed for the Immigration Act when it was revised in
1976.20
The possibility of a Charter challenge to this section of the Regulations
is less straightforward than in the case of the regulation stipulating age
as a condition for admission. A challenge to s. 4()(a) of the Regulations
would require that s.15 of the Charter be interpreted as a protection
against discrimination on the basis of marital status, and possibly on the
basis of sexual orientation.
Section 15(1) of the Charter states that
"Every individual is equal before and under the law and has
the right to equal protection of the law without discrimina-
tion and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic orig.n, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability."
Section 27 of the Charter directs that
"This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent
with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural
heritage of Canadians."'
19 See supra, note 7 at 14.
20 The Law Union of Ontario, The Immigrant's Handbook (Montreal: Black
Rose Books, 1981) at 42.




Section 27 may be only a rule of construction but in the context of immigra-
tion policy it takes on a particular significance. As Professor Julius Grey
has pointed out in his book Immigration Law in Canada:
"It [s. 27] is an indication that Canada has not repudiated its
beginnings as a nation of immigrants and that, whatever the
temoporary pressures of unemployment, social conditions, or
security may be, a generally liberal attitude
towards...immigration is an integral part of our tradition and
should continue."'
Since Canadian courts have yet to rule extensively on the issue of
whether s.15 provides protection on the basis of marital status and/or
sexual orientation, the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights
has made recommendations regarding proposed changes or developments
in future legislation. The Committee has stated that in applying the
Charter to distinctions on the basis of marital status, there are likely to
be many situations where such distinctions can be "demonstrably justi-
fied" pursuant to s. 1 of the Charter. The Committee points out that
"Many statutes...treat those in a marriage or a family differ-
ently from others on the basis that the family represents an
economic unit. That may be a fair and relevant assumption to
make in fashioning the terms of a taxation scheme or an
income security programme. It might not be relevant in
another context."2
The Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights speaks strongly in
favour of extending recognition of common-law relationships in federal
legislation so as to equate their effect with that given legal marriages.
It recommends that when benefits are conferred or obligations imposed
upon partners in a legal marriage, these benefits and obligations ought to
apply equally to common-law spouses.
The Committee goes on, however, to require that a consistent definition
of common-law relationships be incorporated in all federal laws and
policies that recognize such relationships. For this purpose, it recom-
mends that
"...the definition require that the parties be of the opposite
sex, reside continuously with each other for at least one-year,
and represent themselves publicly as husband and wife.,"
With regard specifically to the Immigration Regulations, the
Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights recommends that common-
Supra, note 15 at 59 (excerpt).
24 Supra, note 15 at 34.
2s Ibid.
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law relationships be recognized for immigration purposes, so that a
party to such a relationship may be admitted to Canada as an accompa-
nying dependent of his or her common-law spouse, or may be sponsored for
admission to Canada by his or her common-law spouse. "Spouse" would,
however, be defined as above.26
There is therefore ample support for the idea that the provisions for
spousal sponsorship set out in s. 4(1) of the Immigration Regulations
ought to apply equally to common-law spouses, provided they fit a cer-
tain definition. Given the definition imposed, however, homosexual
couples may find their only challenge of the regulation in an interpreta-
tion of s. 15 of the Charter which would forbid discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.
Although the Committee on Equality Rights reaches in its report the
tentative conclusion that "sexual orientation" should be read into the
general open-ended language of s. 15 of the Charter as a constitutionally
prohibited ground of discrimination, how likely is it that a challenge to
s. 4(1) of the Regulations would be successful on that basis? Since judicial
reaction to questions involving homosexuality is frequently at a visceral
level, the likelihood of s. 1 being successfully invoked to "demonstrably
justify" this discrimination is greater than in the case of heterosexual
common-law relationships.
3. DE FACTO FAMILY MEMBERS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE
FAMILY CLASS
A de facto member is described in immigration policy guidelines as a per-
son who is considered to be a member of the family unit and who is
dependent for physical, emotional, or psychological support on the fam-
ily. The brief prepared by the NSRSC affirms that this definition is
"fairly accurate", but points out that
"In practice...de facto relationships resulting from the tradi-
tion of extended families in many cultures are given little or no
recognition by immigration officials. This denies the values
and cultural heritage of many Canadians and ignores the goal
of family reunification stated in the Act. The guidelines
should be made more specific to recognize the permanent
aspects of such relationships.'27
De facto relationships would in appropriate circumstances include
siblings of all ages. Thus a provision for sponsorship of de facto family
26 Supra, note 15 at 64.
27Supra, note 7 at 14.
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members would allow for consistent consideration of applications like
those of the Salvadoran couple mentioned earlier in this piece. Indeed,
the non-eligibility of brothers and sisters for sponsorship has been of
great concern to many community groups, as well as to the Standing
Committee, which recommended that further recognition of the impor-
tance of close family be given by elevating the legislative position of
siblings.' The Standing Committee failed, however, to support a posi-
tion that siblings ought to be automatically "sponsorable", instead con-
tinuing to relegate them to the class of individuals that must amass a
certain number of "points" before being eligible to immigrate, assigning
siblings a status only slightly above that of independent applicants.
Such a position would likely not be satisfactory for groups like the Non-
Status Residents Support Committee or the Coalition for a Just Refugee
and Immigration Policy. These groups have stated far more emphati-
cally that the Immigration Regulations' failure to recognize siblings as
close relatives flies in the face of the Immigration Act's stated commit-
ment to family reunification.
CONCLUSION
The definition of "family" in the Immigration Regulations must be
reformed to incorporate a more realistic, timely and global definition of
the family that would allow for the sponsorship of "spouses" of all
descriptions, children of all ages and other relatives who are de facto
psychological or economic dependents of a Canadian citizen or permanent
resident. A Constitutional obligation to doing so lies in ss. 15 and 27 of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Canada has made a constitutional
commitment in s. 27 to interpret the Charter in a spirit of "preserving and
enhancing the multicultural heritage of Canada". More importantly,
certain provisions of the Immigration Regulations as they now exist con-
travene certain protected guarantees under s.15 of the Charter, and
therefore run the risk of being read down as unconstitutional. These pro-
visions ought to be amended, bearing in mind s.15 and its guarantee of
freedom from discrimination based on age, nationality, and, possibly,
marital status and sexual orientation.
Any perceived public call to "tighten up" Canadian immigration policy
should only encourage governmental action to re-examine the restrictive-
ness of existing family reunification provisions in the Immigration
Regulations. The inevitable result of unrealistically restrictive legisla-
tion which acts to keep families apart is abuse of other processes by fam-
ilies or couples desperate to remain together. While this "abuse" does
not take place with the frequency critics of Canadian immigration policy
often claim that it does, the fact remains that an individual continually
2 Supra, note 4 at 9.
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frustrated in his or her attempts to regularize status in Canada will ulti-
mately abandon legal means of doing so in favor of other avenues.
Finally, and most obviously, Canada needs immigrants. Since s. 3 of the
Immigration Act makes it clear that one of the primary goals of our
immigration scheme is to encourage the reunification of families, what
better way to ensure that our population does not decrease to economi-
cally dangerous levels in the coming decades than to take this goal seri-
ously? A global and humane definition of the family, in keeping with
the models of "family" that exist in the cultures from which Canada
draws immigrants would satisfy Canada's constitutional, sociological
and economic needs. More importantly, it would do an effective and hon-
est job of reuniting families.
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APPENDIX
SECTION 4(1) OF THE IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS
(Pursuant to Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52)
4(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), every Canadian citizen and every
permanent resident may, if he is residing in Canada and is at least
eighteen years of agesponsor an application for landing made
(a) by his spouse;
(b) by his unmarried son or daughter who is less than
(i) 21 years of age at the time the son or daughter applies for
an immigrant visa and at the time the sponsor gives the
undertaking referred to in subparagraph 6(1)(b)(i) and
(ii) 23 years of age at the time an immigrant visa is issued to
the son or daughter or at the time the application for landing
is refused under subsection 79(1) of the Act;
(c) by his father, mother, grandfather or grandmother under sixty years
of age if the father, mother, grandfather or grandmother and his or her
spouse are incapable of gainful employment or if the father, mother,
grandfather or grandmother is widowed.
(e) by any brother, sister, nephew, niece, grandson or granddaughter of
his who is an orphan, under eighteen years of age and unmarried;
(f) by his fiancde,
(g) by any child under thirteen years of age whom he intends to adopt
and who is
(i) an orphan,
(ii) an abandoned child whose parents cannot be identified,
(iii) a child born outside marriage who has been placed with
a child welfare authority for adoption;
(iv) a child whose parents are separated and who has been
placed with a child welfare authority for adoption; or
(v) a child one of whose parents is deceased and who has been
placed with a child welfare authority for adoption, and
(h) where he does not have a spouse, son, daughter, father, mother,
grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece
i) who is a Canadian citizen
(ii) who is a permanent resident, or
(iii) whose application for landing he may otherwise sponsor
